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REASONS AND BELIEF’S JUSTIFICATION 
Clayton Littlejohn 
(Draft of 6.5.2010) 
 
Forthcoming in A. Reisner and A. Steglich-Petersen (ed.), Reasons for Belief (Cambridge University 
Press).   
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
There’s little to say about justification that cannot be said in terms of reasons.  If you Φ and thereby 
do all that the reasons demanded, it cannot be that you oughtn’t have Φ’d.  If it’s not the case that 
you oughtn’t have Φ’d, there’s no further question as to whether your Φ-ing was justified.  Having 
done all that you should, there’s no reason left standing to demand that you refrain from Φ-ing. 
There’s nothing that could stand in the way of the justification of your actions or attitudes.  Here’s 
our first connection.  If you’ve done all that the reasons demand, nothing prevents your actions or 
attitudes from being justified. On the other hand, we shouldn’t believe or act without adequate 
justification.  When you oughtn’t Φ, there’s an undefeated reason that demands that you refrain 
from Φ-ing.  It’s because of this reason that Φ-ing is beyond justification and the most you could 
hope for is an excuse.  Think of cases of conflicting reasons.  The only way to justify Φ-ing in the 
face of reasons that count against Φ-ing is to point to considerations that defeat these reasons.  If 
the reasons you need cannot be found (i.e., reasons that defeat the case against Φ-ing), we can say 
that Φ-ing cannot be justified because there are reasons that demand that you not Φ that are not 
defeated.  Here’s our second connection.  Fail to do what the relevant reasons demand and your 
actions and attitudes are beyond justification.   
 If we assume this much, there’s little that distinguishes doing all that the reasons require 
from acting or believing with justification.  So, we ought to be able to work from an account of 
reasons and their demands to an account of justification.1  To do this, we have to settle a question 
about reasons.  We know that reasons are demanding things, but what do they demand?  Maybe 
reasons are reasons to conform.2  If there’s reason for you to Φ, its demands are met iff you Φ.  
Critics say that this account misrepresents their demands.  According to one objection, it would be 
unreasonable for reasons to demand full conformity, so they must demand something less.3  
According to another, mere conformity doesn’t ensure that your actions or attitudes are justified 
                                                        
1 The conclusions I’ll defend concern the justification of belief, the examples will typically concern 
reasons for action.  Like Alston (1988), I think we have a firmer grip on what reasons for action 
require. Also, at a certain level of abstraction we ought to expect that reasons for action and belief 
demand similar sorts of things.  As Gibbons (Forthcoming) puts it, the similarities between reasons 
for action and belief have a built in explanation the dissimilarities lack because both are reasons.    
2 Gardner (2007) and Raz (1990) defend the view.  Gardner rejects the view that justification is 
simply a matter of conforming to undefeated reasons. 
3 Audi (2001), Bird (2007), Cohen (1984), Conee and Feldman (2004), Gibbons (Forthcoming), 
Herman (1994), Langsam (2008), and Wedgwood (2002a) each in their own way suggest that 
there’s no real difference between the justified and the reasonable.    
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because you can conform to some reason quite in spite of your deliberative efforts.4  Reasons 
demand more than conformity. 
 In the first part of the paper, I’ll look at some competing accounts of reasons and their 
demands.  It’s fair to criticize the conformity account on the grounds that justification involves 
more than merely conforming to the demands of the undefeated reasons.  Normative appraisal is 
not wholly unconcerned with the reasons for which we act and believe, a fact that’s hard to square 
with the conformity account.  It’s a mistake, however, to say that normative appraisal is concerned 
only with the reasons for which we act and believe.  Reasons demand full conformity but don’t 
demand compliance.  The right account occupies a middle ground between the conformity and 
compliance accounts.   
 In the second part of the paper, I’ll argue that there’s something wrong with two influential 
approaches to epistemic justification.  I’ll focus on evidentialism and the knowledge account 
because they face structurally similar problems.5 They’re either wrong about which norms govern 
belief or mistaken about what the reasons associated with these norms demand.  There’s more to a 
belief’s justification than the evidentialist maintains and less to a belief’s justification than the 
knowledge account says.   
 
2.  REASONS AND DEMANDS 
According to the conformity account:  
I:  In Φ-ing, S does all that the reasons require iff S conforms to the 
relevant reasons. 
If you have a reason to Φ, you conform to that reason iff you Φ.  We talk as if we have reasons for 
bringing about certain (external) states of affairs.  It’s possible to fail to conform to such reasons 
without thereby being anything less than fully reasonable or responsible.  Those who think that 
reasons cannot demand that we bring about states of affairs on the grounds that someone might try 
but fail to do so without being anything less than rational or responsible often say that normative 
evaluation ought to be concerned only with the qualities of someone’s deliberative efforts.  They 
likely opt for a view along these lines:  
II:  In Φ-ing, S has done all that the reasons require iff S is no 
less than fully reasonable and responsible for having Φ’d. 
Coming from a slightly different direction, some might object to (I) on the grounds that it 
fails to represent the full range of demands reasons make.  While the results of our deliberative 
efforts do matter, reasons are also there to guide the way we reason, and the conformity account 
fails to do justice to this.  So, someone might opt for the compliance account:  
III:  In Φ-ing, S has done all that the reasons require iff S 
complies with the relevant reasons. 
To comply with some reason to Φ is to Φ for that very reason.  On this third account, normative 
appraisal is concerned both with the quality and results of our deliberative efforts.  Sympathetic as I 
am to the idea that normative appraisal is concerned with the quality of our deliberative efforts, I 
shall argue that it’s a mistake to say as (II) does that this is the sole concern of normative appraisal                                                         
4 A point stressed by Gardner (2005: 111) who insists that justification isn’t just a matter of 
showing that someone’s actions made the world better, but also a matter of showing that the 
subject’s deeds or beliefs could be attributed to the subject’s excelling at rationality.    
5 See Adler (2002), Conee and Feldman (2004), Shah (2006), and Steup (2001) for defenses of 
evidentialism.  Williamson (2000) defends the knowledge account as does Bird (2007), Huemer 
(2008), and Sutton (2005, 2007).  Adler (2002) might defend both views.       
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and argue that (III) is wrong in the way it takes the justification of our actions and attitudes to 
depend on the reasons for which we act and believe.  The right account is found somewhere in 
between (I) and (III).  
 
2.1 REASONS AND RATIONALITY 
 
Some object to the conformity and compliance accounts on the grounds that they represent reasons 
as making unreasonable demands.6 It’s said that (I) fails to do justice to the deontological character 
of justification we’re urged to accept (II) in its place.  Those who defend the deontological theory 
of justification often say that theirs is a view on which a belief is justified when it is, “epistemically 
permissible, a belief for which the subject cannot justly be blamed, or a belief the subject is not 
obliged to drop.”7  The argument would be this.  If we opt for (I), we have to allow for cases in 
which a subject who oughtn’t Φ reasonably judges she ought to Φ.  Suppose, if only for reductio, 
that such a case is possible.  That she oughtn’t Φ would mean that there’s an undefeated reason that 
demands that the agent refrain from Φ-ing.  When the agent acts in accordance with her judgment 
about what she ought to do she will thereby be in breach of her duties or obligations.  But, the 
objection continues, this cannot be.  It cannot be that her duty or responsibility was to refrain from 
Φ-ing because we cannot properly accuse her of any irresponsibility for having Φ’d.  Thus, reasons 
do not demand conformity, as (I) states.  If, as a result of our deliberative efforts, we cannot be said 
to be anything less than fully reasonable or responsible, we cannot fail to do what the reasons 
demanded from us. 
There’s little to be said for this argument. The term ‘responsibility’ has a backwards-
looking and forward-looking sense.  The argument conflates these.  It’s true that if we oughtn’t Φ, 
we have an undefeated reason to refrain from Φ-ing. In that sense, refraining from Φ-ing is a 
responsibility of ours.  Here, ‘responsibility’ is synonymous with ‘duty’.  It’s true that if we non-
culpably judge that we ought to Φ and Φ accordingly, we cannot be accused of any irresponsibility.  
Here, however, ‘responsibility’ is being used with its hypological inflection.8  To say that we 
cannot be accused of any irresponsibility in this sense is to say that blame is inappropriate.  In the 
absence of a reason to think that anyone who acts responsibly thereby meets her responsibilities, 
this argument gives us no reason to accept (II).   
To see why reasons demand more than (II) suggests, consider three cases:  
C1:  Green sees Peacock aim her revolver at Plum and knowing that 
the only way he can prevent Peacock from shooting Plum is by 
hitting Peacock with a candlestick.  He hits her with the 
candlestick, thus saving Plum’s life but injuring Peacock. 
C2:  White sees Green raising a candlestick with the intention of 
hitting Peacock but does not realize that Green is trying to protect 
Plum.  Believing that Green is trying to murder Peacock, he picks                                                         
6 This complaint is sometimes voiced by those who work on moral luck and deny that consequential 
luck can determine whether we’ve lived up to our obligations. See, for example, Nagel’s (1979: 
31) remark that strict liability might have its uses in the law but is “irrational as a moral position”.           
7 Steup (1999: 375).  The argument sketched would be endorsed by those who take the reasonable 
to be the mark of the permissible.    
8  Hypological judgments pertain to accountability, liability, responsibility, culpability and the like.  
See Zimmerman (2002).   
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up a wrench and swings it at Green, mistakenly believing that this 
is justified on grounds of protecting an innocent party.  
C3:  In an unrelated incident, Mustard stabbed White. He had gone 
mad. 
Our ordinary scheme of normative appraisal recognizes a distinction between denials of 
responsibility (e.g., (C3)) and excuses (e.g., (C2)).9  It also recognizes a distinction between 
excuses and justifications where a justification depends upon showing that an action is right or 
permitted (e.g., (C1)).  It’s possible to maintain these distinctions and thus allow that these three 
cases illustrate three distinct ways of removing blame only if it’s possible for an agent to be no less 
than fully rational or responsible even if the agent’s action is an instance of excusable wrongdoing.  
An action can only be an instance of excusable wrongdoing, however, if the agent who performs 
the action fails to do what she ought to have done.  An action can be all things considered wrong 
only if the agent who performs them has failed to do what the reasons required.  Hence, it’s 
possible for an agent to be fully reasonable and responsible while failing to do all that the reasons 
required.  Thus, we must reject (II).   
 To defend (II), someone would have to show that our three cases do not illustrate three 
distinct ways of removing blame.  It’s clear that (C2) and (C3) differ significantly.  To remove 
blame in (C3), we would have to show that Mustard lacked the capacities necessary for being 
properly held accountable for his deeds.  As White can be held responsible for his deeds, if we are 
going to argue that White cannot be blamed for his deeds, it seems our only other option is to 
argue that White’s actions, though wrongful, were nevertheless what we would expect from a fully 
reasonable agent.  Given how things seemed to him at the time, we might say, we can see that 
White’s response is no indication that he is anything less than fully virtuous.  Presumably it is this 
that defenders of (II) must deny.  They must deny that we excuse someone from wrongdoing by 
showing that their actions or attitudes were reasonable and that they were fully responsible for 
having acted or believed as they did.  They must insist that this is a justification because defenders of 
(II) take the mark of permissibility to be an agent’s being fully reasonable and responsible for having 
acted as she did.  
This response puts defenders of (II) in a bit of a bind.  The mark of permissibility isn’t what 
they say it is.  To defend their view, they have to classify the actions in (C1) and (C2) as right, thus 
denying that (C2) is a case of excusable wrongdoing.  This doesn’t sit well with intuition.  Think 
about justified intervention.  One striking difference between (C1) and (C2) is that it seems that an 
informed bystander could justifiably use force to assist Green but only justifiably use force to 
interfere with White.  The natural explanation for this difference would seem to be that there is a 
difference in the deontic statuses of Green’s and White’s actions.10  If we say both acted rightly, we 
run out of moral distinctions to use to explain this difference.  We should classify (C2) as a case of 
excusable wrongdoing and reject the link between being fully reasonable and doing what the 
reasons demand. 
 
2.2  CONFORMITY OR COMPLIANCE? 
                                                         
9 Strawson (1962) refers to denials of responsibility as “exemptions”, but I’ll use Gardner (2007) 
and Horder’s (2004) terminology. 
10 As Robinson (1996) argues.  Husak (1999) argues that there are problems with the details of the 
argument and I address his concerns in Littlejohn (MS). 
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Reasons demand conformity.  The question is whether their demands end there.  Critics of the 
conformity account insist that they demand more.  Critics of the compliance account insist that they 
demand less than compliance.  The critics are right.  We ought to reject (I) and (III).  The problem 
with the conformity account is that it denies that the quality of our deliberative efforts could have 
any bearing on whether we have done what the reasons required of us, that we could do what the 
reasons require quite in spite of our deliberative efforts.  That’s a mistake.  Justification does 
depend on explanatory reasons, but not in the way the compliance account suggests. 
 According to the compliance account, a reason to Φ demands that you Φ for that very 
reason.  Doing all the reasons require depends on whether you conform to those reasons from 
those very reasons.  This can’t be right.  Consider cases of overdetermination.  Suppose there are 
two perfectly good reasons for Mustard to turn Plum in to the police.  Are we to say that Mustard 
did anything less than what the reasons required if he turned her in to protect White?  Surely not.11  
But, Mustard did not comply with an undefeated reason.  If we think that any failure to do what an 
undefeated reason demands without any reason for so this failure is prima facie wrongful, we would 
have to think of his actions as being prima facie wrongful.  Or, consider cases where the good 
reasons to act are explanatorily idle.  If Mustard turns Plum in so that he can use the reward to buy 
himself something rather nice, what of it?  Again, his actions aren’t prima facie wrongful, but he has 
not complied with any particularly good reason.12  The lesson is that the failure to comply with 
undefeated reasons does not by itself show that the agent’s actions or attitudes are wrongful.  This 
seems hard to square with the idea that reasons demand compliance.   
 Those who defend the compliance account insist that reasons demand more than mere 
conformity.  If we know Plum moved her arm because she tried to sock Green in the jaw, it seems 
this alone is enough to show that Plum’s action is prima facie wrongful.  We know it is wrongful 
even if we do not yet know whether she made contact.  The point is obvious enough. We can show 
that someone’s actions or attitudes are wrongful even if we do not show that they acted against 
some undefeated reason.  We only have to show that the agent’s deliberative efforts were of 
sufficiently poor quality by showing that the agent either was willing to bringing about the bad or 
indifferent to the prospect of doing so.  The malicious, negligent, and reckless agent fails to do 
what the reasons demand of them.  This seems hard to square with the conformity account because 
we can easily imagine that there is no undefeated reason to which the agent fails to conform even 
though the agent is malicious, negligent, or reckless.   
 The considerations that cause trouble for the conformity and compliance accounts suggest 
that normative appraisal is concerned with both the quality and results of our deliberative efforts.  
An account that seems to do justice to this is a modified version of the compliance account that 
insists that you ought to always act or believe for some undefeated reason.13  It allows that you 
needn’t act for every undefeated reason.  If the reasons for which you Φ correspond to some 
undefeated reason, you have done all that the reasons require.  Do anything less, and you fail to do 
all the reasons require. 
 The view is nicely tailored for addressing the problems that beset the conformity and 
compliance accounts, but the theoretical motivation for the view might seem obscure.  It denies 
that reasons individually demand compliance but insists that there is nevertheless always a demand                                                         
11 See Raz (1999: 91). 
12 See Raz (1990: 180). 
13 Gardner (2007) defends the view that justification requires acting for an undefeated reason and 
Raz (1990: 40) defended the view that we always ought to act for some undefeated reason when he 
first published Practical Reason and Norms.  He no longer defends the view.     
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to comply with some undefeated reason or other, so from where does this demand come?  One 
suggestion is that if we always act or believe on an undefeated reason, we better conform to the 
demands reasons place upon us.14  The problem is that it seems to give an instrumental justification 
for the principle and that’s too weak for our purposes.  If we say there’s overall reason to Φ, it’s 
true that anyone who acts for an undefeated reason will conform to the demands of the undefeated 
reason.  However, it’s also true that someone can act for the wrong sorts of reasons knowing the 
act happens to be what there’s overall reason to do.  We cannot appeal to an instrumental principle 
to explain why we regard their actions as wrongful. Suppose Mustard sees Green take aim at Plum 
with a revolver and clubs him with a pipe knowing that this sort of thing would be justified on 
grounds of defending another.  Suppose Mustard acts only with the motive of injuring his old 
enemy.  Knowing what he knows, he knows that his act conforms to an undefeated reason.  If the 
principle that you ought always act for some undefeated reason is just an instrumental principle, it 
doesn’t explain why Mustard’s action is wrongful.    
One problem with the proposal, then, is this.  As the motivation for the view cannot stem 
from a description of the demands individual reasons make, its motivation must derive from 
elsewhere.  The justification that has been offered is instrumental and an instrumental principle is 
too weak. We want an account that accommodates the idea that normative appraisal is concerned 
with both the results of our deliberative efforts and the quality of those efforts.  The modified 
compliance account doesn’t quite do that, either.  For the account asserts that we must always act 
for some undefeated reason, that the reason for which we Φ corresponds to a genuine reason to Φ.  
The lack of such a correspondence is not itself any indication that the agent’s deliberative efforts are 
defective in any way. Plum knows she’s promised to meet Green for lunch but hears that her 
former colleague Peacock has fallen ill and rushes to see her.  Suppose we learn that Plum acts from 
a sense of religious duty rather than direct concern for Peacock’s welfare.  Plum is pious in a way 
many of us are not, and many of us can see no reason for discharging what she regards as her 
religious duties.  We might say that she’s reasonable for having judged that she ought to visit 
Peacock and no less than fully reasonable or rational for having both acted as she did and for the 
reasons she did.  But, we would by chary to say that her reason for acting corresponded to any real 
reason for acting.  So, we could not say it corresponded to any undefeated reason.  Nevertheless, I 
see no reason to say that she did anything less than what the reasons required of her or that her 
actions were less than fully justified.   
Note two things.  First, if she did nothing wrongful, we have a perfectly good 
counterexample to the principle that states we ought always act for undefeated reason.  The reason 
for which she acted isn’t a valid reason.  Second, it shows that the rationale for that principle cannot 
be that normative appraisal is concerned both with the quality of the agent’s deliberative efforts and 
the results of those efforts.  For that principle asserts that there must be a correspondence between 
the reasons for which an agent acts and an undefeated reason.  The mere lack of such a 
correspondence is no indication that there was any defect in the way the agent deliberated.  Nor 
does it indicate that the subject failed to conform to undefeated reasons.  So, if the view’s 
motivation stems from the thought that normative appraisal is concerned with both the quality and 
results of an agent’s deliberative efforts, the view’s motivation seems to support only the weaker 
view that we ought always conform to undefeated reasons while refraining from deliberating in 
ways that show disrespect for the reason’s status as a reason. 
                                                        
14 Gardner (2007: 101). 
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 Perhaps that’s the right view.15  There are always two ways to go wrong, either by failing 
to conform to an undefeated reason or by deliberating in ways that manifest willingness or 
indifference to acting against a reason.  Don’t go wrong in these ways and we can’t fail to be 
justified.  Doing all that the reasons require thus depends both on the explanatory and normative 
reasons.  What distinguishes the modified compliance account from the present account is not this 
point, a point on which they agree, but the way these accounts take the normative status of our 
actions and attitudes to depend on explanatory reasons.  The present account takes the normative 
status of our actions and attitudes to be negatively dependent on explanatory reasons.  The modified 
compliance account insisted on a correspondence between the reasons for which you Φ and some 
undefeated reason for you to Φ.  It thus makes the normative status of our actions and attitudes 
positively dependent on the reasons for which we act or believe what we do.  Remember that the 
theoretical motivation for these accounts is the same.  It’s the observation that normative appraisal 
is concerned with the agent’s contribution to action and belief. Objective features of the situation 
may determine what reasons there are, but they don’t tell us that the agent’s response to what she 
took these reasons to be is flawed, defective, or blemished in any way.  If we were to say that the 
normative status of our actions and attitudes were positively dependent on explanatory reasons, 
insisting that we must always act for some genuine undefeated reason, this would have to derive 
from somewhere else.  But we’ve seen that it can’t derive from the assumption that reasons 
demand compliance, because they don’t.  So, the view that best harmonizes with intuition and the 
theoretical motivations offered for the rival accounts seems to be the view that a reason to Φ 
demands conformity and demands refraining from deliberating in ways that show disrespect for that 
reason’s status as a reason.16  
 An example should help. Plum and Green take aim at Mustard and fire their revolvers.  
One of their bullets strikes, but one misses.  The agent that shot Mustard acted against the reason 
associated with the duty of non-maleficence.  It’s clear that both agents’ actions were wrongful.  It 
seems we don’t need to think about different features of Mustard to understand why both actions 
were wrongful.  It’s not as if the duty of non-maleficence demands that you refrain from shooting 
Mustard because he’s sentient and then some other duty distinct from the duty of non-maleficence 
that demands that you refrain from trying to shoot him or failing to take due care to avoid shooting 
him in virtue of some features of Mustard other than sentience so that if there were some sentient 
being that lacked this further feature it would be wrong to shoot it but not wrong to try. There’s 
just the one set of features of Mustard in light of which we can say that they oughtn’t to have shot 
him, tried to shoot him, or fail to take due care to avoid shooting him.  If we don’t need two sets of 
features of Mustard to understand why these actions were wrongful, do we really need two 
different kinds of reasons where Plum failed to meet the demands of the first and Green failed to 
meet the demands of the second?  I think not.  We don’t need to wait for the ballistics report.  We 
need only the duty of non-maleficence and the reason associated with it to see that both agents’ 
actions were wrongful and why they were.  When there’s reason not to Φ, the reason demands 
that you refrain from Φ-ing and demands that you don’t deliberate in a way that shows disrespect 
for the reason’s status as a reason.  Beyond that, however, reasons demand nothing further.                                                          
15 Sverdlik (1996) defends the view that sufficiently bad motives and intentions can make otherwise 
justifiable actions wrongful.  Like him, I want to say that normative appraisal is concerned with the 
reasons for which an agent Φ’s because it is interested in the quality of the agent’s deliberative 
efforts.    
16 On this view, reasons can both count against Φ-ing while excluding other reasons, namely those 
that we cannot deliberate from if we take due care to avoid Φ-ing. 
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3.  JUSTIFICATION 
Let’s assume, if only as a working hypothesis, that reasons typically place upon us a pair of 
conceptually related demands.  If you have reason not to Φ, in the absence of reasons to the 
contrary, you oughtn’t Φ and oughtn’t deliberate in ways that show disrespect for that reason’s 
status as a reason.  In other words, you ought not Φ and exercise due care to see to it that you do 
not Φ.  Combine this account with the account of the connection between reasons and justification 
outlined in the paper’s introduction, and it seems we ought to be able to work from a description 
of the norms of belief to an account of justified belief.  Associated with any norm governing belief is 
a reason that demands, inter alia, that we conform to that norm.  For any type of epistemic reason, 
assume there’s a norm stating the conditions under which there is such a reason.  A belief’s 
justification depends on whether a belief conforms to the norms governing that belief and whether 
the subject can reasonably assume that the belief so conforms.  Its justification shouldn’t depend on 
much else. 
 If there were some consensus view as to which norm or norms governed belief, our work 
would be done.  There is no such consensus view.  I’ll look at two of the more influential 
approaches to epistemic justification and argue that these approaches are flawed.  The first, the 
evidentialist account, asserts that a belief’s justification is determined entirely by relations between 
this belief and the evidence an individual has on hand.17  Facts that do not supervene on an 
individual’s evidence might figure in some kinds of epistemic appraisal, but not appraisal concerned 
with a belief’s justification.  The second, the knowledge account, says we ought to characterize 
justification using the concept of knowledge and work from the assumption that knowledge is the 
norm of belief.18  These views, I’ll argue, either rest on mistaken assumptions about the kinds of 
things that reasons demand or mistaken assumptions about the norms governing belief and the kinds 
of epistemic reasons there are.   
 
3.1 EVIDENTIALISM  
 
Evidentialists say the considerations that bear on whether to believe p consist of considerations 
taken to bear on the truth of p and can only consist of such considerations.  Considerations that bear 
instead on, say, the practical benefits of believing p, however, do not give reason to believe p.  Why 
don’t practical considerations bear on whether we ought to believe?  What explains the hegemony 
of evidence in doxastic deliberation? 
Here’s one possible explanation.19  First, it’s said that belief is governed by the truth norm:  
T:  You ought not believe p unless p.20 
Second, it’s supposed to be in virtue of our grasp of this normative truth that considerations taken 
to be irrelevant to the truth of a claim are excluded from deliberation so that only considerations                                                         
17 Adler (2002), Conee and Feldman (2004), Shah (2006), and Steup (2001) defend evidentialist 
views that differ in various ways but seem to agree that a belief’s justification turns entirely on the 
evidence the believer has that bears on the truth or falsity of that belief.   
18 See Williamson (2000). 
19 Adler (2002) and Shah (2006) offer this sort of explanation.  Steglich-Petersen (2006) argues that 
you don’t need to assume that truth is the norm of belief to explain belief’s transparency to truth. 
20 Owing to the factivity of knowledge, anyone who thinks that knowledge is the fundamental norm 
of belief thinks that truth is a norm of belief.  Boghossian (2003), Velleman (2000), Wedgwood 
(2002b), and Williams (1973) also defend the view that belief is governed by the truth norm. 
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taken to bear on the truth of the relevant proposition are included in doxastic deliberation.  Third, 
nothing can be a reason unless it can figure in reasoning.21  If we add this assumption that a 
consideration can constitute a reason to believe or act only if it is capable of being a reason for 
which we believe or act, we have our argument for evidentialism.  What we ought to believe is a 
function of the reasons there are, and considerations unrelated to truth have just been disqualified 
as potential reasons.  Thus, “only evidence for and against the truth of p is relevant to answering the 
doxastic question whether to believe that p”.22   
 I think the argument fails as an argument for evidentialism even if it rules out the possibility 
of practical reasons to believe.  If belief is governed by the truth norm, there’s a reason to refrain 
from believing p if ~p.  Whether a belief misrepresents how things are is not something that 
supervenes on an individual’s evidence.  So, the evidentialist cannot say both that belief is governed 
by the truth norm and that only evidence for and against a belief bears on whether to believe some 
proposition.  The evidentialist cannot motivate the evidentialist view by saying that the truth norm 
governs belief and then deny that the falsity of a belief gives us reason not to believe.  If they say that 
a belief’s justification depends on the evidence and not also the truth, they would have to say that 
this reason demands something less than full conformity. The problem with this response is 
predictable: reasons demand conformity.   
 I don’t think that the evidentialist view is that beliefs that contravene the truth norm are 
justified because evidence gives overriding reason to contravene that norm.  The evidentialist seems 
to think that the justification of our beliefs depends on the evidence and nothing further because 
belief is governed by the truth norm.  Norms don’t typically give overriding reason for their own 
violation.  There’s an important difference between cases of conflicting reasons and the case in 
which good evidence supports a false belief.  In the case of conflicting reasons, we can be fully 
aware of both sets of reasons and knowingly judge that we ought to act on the undefeated reason.  
No one thinks that we can be aware of the evidence, aware that there is reason to refrain from 
believing p because of how that belief contravenes the truth norm, and knowingly judge that we 
ought to believe what the evidence supports.  If the evidentialist wants to deny that the truth of our 
beliefs is necessary for their justification, they had better deny that belief is governed by the truth 
norm.23   
  Some evidentialists seem to do just this.24  They say that a belief’s truth is unnecessary for 
its justification without having to say that a belief’s failure to conform to the norms of belief is 
irrelevant to the belief’s justification.  Rather than say that the reasons demand less than 
conformity, some evidentialists will say that only evidential norms govern belief.25  This move                                                         
21 Shah (2006: 484) attributes this assumption to Williams (1981). 
22 Shah (2006: 498).  According to Owens (2000), the amount of evidence necessary for properly 
settling the question whether to believe might depend on the practical significance of adopting a 
belief on the matter and closing deliberation.  Fantl and McGrath (2002) later defend a similar 
claim. Shah might say that his conclusion is not threatened by these authors’ conclusions by saying 
that only evidence is relevant in the way reasons are to answering the question whether to believe p.    
23 This comes with costs.  It undermines the explanation that has been given for the transparency of 
belief to truth and the aim of belief. 
24 See Conee and Feldman (2004). 
25 Feldman (1988a: 247) says we might have truth as a goal, but insists that the truth or falsity of a 
belief has no bearing on what we ought to believe because a belief could be false without our 
knowing it.  This suggests that he thinks that reasons can bear on what we ought to believe only if 
we have access to these reasons.  I’d say that the truth of a belief cannot give you reason to believe 
 10 
avoids one set of problems, but introduces new ones.  Briefly, here are two.  First, the truth norm 
plays an important role in explanations as to why belief is transparent to truth and why only what 
the agent takes to be truth-related considerations can figure in doxastic deliberation.  Second, think 
about the connection between an agent’s beliefs about what she should do and the actions she 
performs in light of these beliefs.  The agent’s beliefs about what she should do rationalize 
intentions that rationalize actions.  I think that the intention can rationalize the action, in part, 
because once the case for intending to Φ is settled, there is no further question to settle to 
determine whether to Φ.26  I think the belief that you should Φ is a belief that can rationalize the 
intention, in part, because once the case for believing that you ought to Φ is settled, there’s no 
further question to settle to determine whether to intend to Φ.27  If that’s right, that suggests that 
when there is sufficient reason to believe that you ought to Φ, there’s sufficient reason to intend to 
Φ and act accordingly.  Of course, if there is a decisive case against Φ-ing, there’s not a sufficient 
case for Φ-ing.  So, if there’ss a decisive case against Φ-ing, the reasons that oblige you to refrain 
from Φ-ing would seem to oblige you to refrain from intending to Φ and from believing that you 
ought to Φ.  Since the facts that determine whether you ought to Φ sometimes include facts that do 
not supervene upon the evidence, these external facts that oblige you to refrain from Φ-ing oblige 
you to refrain from concluding deliberation by forming the belief that you ought to Φ.  That’s so 
even if you have the same evidence as someone in some possible world who knows that they should 
Φ.  Provided that you shouldn’t Φ, you shouldn’t conclude deliberation by judging that you should 
Φ.    
 An evidentialist could deny this, but then they have to give us some explanation as to why 
beliefs about what ought to be done rationalize intentions.28  If distinct considerations determine 
whether to believe you ought to Φ and whether to intend to Φ, it’s hard to see why beliefs would 
play this rationalizing role.  If what motivates the evidentialist to deny that belief is governed by the                                                         
unless you’re aware of it, the falsity of a belief can exert its normative force whether you’re aware 
of it or not.  It appears Feldman’s reason for denying there’s a truth norm is that it implies we 
could fail to do all the reasons require without being in a position to know this.  Maybe he adheres 
to (II).    
26 For discussion, see Hieronymi (2005) and Shah (2008). 
27 Concerning the toxin puzzle, we might say that the reason that you cannot form the ‘prize 
winning’ intention is that you know that by forming the intention to Φ, there is nothing further to 
consider in settling the question as to whether to Φ.  However, as you know that there is 
something further to consider (i.e., that you would make yourself sick for no reason), you cannot 
form the intention without adding reasons or manipulating yourself to lose sight of them.  If 
another eccentric billionaire came along and challenged you to come to believe that you ought to 
drink the toxin without forming the intention to drink, I think we just reproduce the original case 
one level up and the same points apply.  You cannot form the prize winning belief because you 
know that if you believe you ought to Φ, there is nothing further to consider in settling the 
question as to whether to intend and whether to act.  But, there is something further to consider 
and so you cannot form the prize winning belief without doing the sorts of things that would allow 
you to form the intention and violating the terms of the arrangement.   
28 Feldman (1988b) claims that it’s possible for someone to justifiably believe that they ought to Φ 
when they oughtn’t Φ. Along with Broome (2001), I think there’s a normative requirement in light 
of which you oughtn’t both: believe that you ought to Φ but not intend to Φ.    
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truth norm is the thought that the truth norm is unreasonable in demanding that believers refrain 
from believing on strong evidence, I think the evidentialist is in trouble.  To block the argument 
above, the evidentialist has to say that facts about what you ought to believe about what you should 
do are fixed by facts about your evidence even if facts about what you ought to do are fixed by 
further facts and allow for pairs of cases where some subject ought to believe she ought to Φ and 
ought to believe she ought to Ψ where she ought to act in light of one belief but not the other.  This 
view is just as unreasonable as the view that states that belief is governed by the truth norm.  
Imagine an advisor who, upon learning that you do not know what to believe about the choice 
between Φ-ing and Ψ-ing says that you ought to think of Φ-ing as a necessary evil.  Imagine this 
same advisor who, upon seeing you Φ, criticizes you for failing to Ψ.  You object but the advisor 
says that she was being perfectly consistent.  One bit of advice was about belief and another about 
action.  If that is what your advisor advises, you need a new advisor.    
 We’ve already seen that among the facts that determine whether someone should act are 
often facts about the situation that do not supervene upon the facts that determine what the agent’s 
evidence is.  The evidentialist insists that it’s only facts that strongly supervene upon the agent’s 
evidence that determine what the agent should believe.  If facts about how an agent should act do 
not supervene upon the evidence but facts about what an agent should believe do supervene upon 
the evidence, it should be possible for the agent to believe she ought to Φ, be obligated to refrain 
from Φ-ing, but have no reason at all to refrain from believing that she ought to Φ.  It’s one thing 
to say that conscience is fallible, but quite another to say that there is an undefeated reason to 
refrain from acting on a normative judgment that is epistemically impeccable.  If the resistance to 
saying that belief is governed by the truth norm is motivated by the thought that such a norm 
demands the unreasonable from agents who have good evidence that supports false propositions, 
surely the norm that enjoins us to refrain from acting on beliefs about what we ought to do even if 
those beliefs are the beliefs we ought to have is equally unreasonable.  So, while I think many of us 
would want to say that just as when there is decisive reason not to Φ, there is decisive reason not to 
intend to Φ, when there is decisive reason not to Φ or intend to Φ, there is decisive reason not to 
believe that you ought to Φ.   
 The problem facing the evidentialist is this.  On the one hand, if you try to motivate the 
view by appeal to the truth norm, you can consistently say that certain considerations that don’t 
bear on the truth of our beliefs cannot constitute reasons for belief, but defending the further claim 
that only pieces of evidence can constitute reasons requires a view of the demands of reasons we 
have already rejected.  It requires thinking of reasons as demanding something less than conformity.  
We can be excused for acting against some undefeated reason, but that is the most we could ever 
hope for.  On the other hand, those unwilling to embrace the conclusion that the falsity of a belief 
constitutes a conclusive reason to refrain from holding it take such a consequence to be a conclusive 
reason for denying that belief is governed by the truth norm.  Instead, they’ll say that belief is 
governed only by evidential norms and the falsity of a belief is said to have no normative 
significance.  False beliefs are failures, to be sure, but not failures that have epistemic normative 
significance.  The problem with this is that it seems hard to square with the idea that a belief’s 
justification depends on whether it’s fit for the purposes of practical deliberation.  When a subject 
cannot both rationally believe a set of claims and refrain from acting, if the agent oughtn’t perform 
the action, the agent oughtn’t hold these beliefs.  A belief is fit for practical deliberation only if it 
should not be excluded from practical deliberation, and whether a belief should be excluded from 
deliberation does not depend solely on the evidence the subject has on hand.   
  
3.2  THE KNOWLEDGE ACCOUNT 
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The problem with the evidentialist view is that it restricts the scope of epistemic evaluation to 
relations between a belief and the evidence an individual happens to have on hand.  The knowledge 
account seems to do justice to the idea that the scope of epistemic evaluation includes relations 
between a belief and the states of affairs it represents by insisting that belief is not governed just by 
evidential norms, but also the knowledge norm:  
  K:  You should not believe p unless you know that p. 
Because knowledge is factive, the knowledge account takes epistemic evaluation to be concerned 
with more than relations between beliefs and the evidence we have on hand.  It would also be 
concerned with relations between these states of mind and the states of the world they represent.  
While this view overcomes a difficulty the evidentialist view cannot, it suffers from difficulties 
structurally similar to those that beset the evidentialist view.  The view is either at odds with 
independently motivated claims about the norms or belief or at odds with the account of reasons 
defended in the first part of the paper. 
 In its most popular form, the knowledge account asserts that knowledge is the norm of 
belief but denies that knowing p is necessary for justifiably believing p:  
Anything short of knowledge is failure. But some failures are 
worse than others. And in particular some failures can be laid at 
the door of the believer, because the source of failure is one or 
more of the believer’s mental states, and some failures can be 
ascribed to mischance, in that the failure is due to some mentally 
extraneous factor. The role of the concept of justification is to 
mark the difference between these different sources of failure.29   
Focus on the last line.  This can’t be right.  Anyone who adopts this attitude towards justification 
has adopted a view on which justification doesn’t involve showing that a justified action or attitude 
does all that the reasons require or has adopted the view that reasons demand something less than 
conformity.  For surely if knowledge is the norm of belief, there’s a reason to refrain from 
believing what you don’t know that constitutes a conclusive reason unless it’s overridden by some 
stronger reason to contravene the knowledge norm.  As no thinks there is such a reason, a defense 
of the knowledge account just is a defense of the idea that there is such a reason to refrain from 
believing what you don’t know to be true.  So, the only way to make sense of this view is to either 
say that we can successfully justify Φ-ing in the face of undefeated reasons not to Φ or assert that 
reasons demand less than conformity.  The first option is incoherent.  The second option is 
indefensible for reasons we’ve discussed already.  You either have to deny that knowledge is the 
norm of belief or accept that a belief’s failure to constitute knowledge constitutes a conclusive 
reason for abandoning that belief.  If knowledge is the norm of belief, knowledge that p is true is 
necessary for having a justified belief that p is true.   
 Some embrace the idea that you can’t justifiably believe what you don’t know, taking this, 
as I do, to be a consequence of treating knowledge as the norm of belief.30  The problem with this                                                         
29 Bird (2007: 95). 
30  Sutton (2005, 2007) defends the view.  Hawthorne and Stanley (2008) express some sympathy 
for the idea that p is a reason for belief iff p is known.  In Littlejohn (2009a), I criticize their 
arguments for the view that it’s proper to treat p as a reason iff you know p.  I think they’re right 
that it’s proper to treat what you know as a reason and improper to treat p as a reason if ~p.  The 
reason, I think, that it’s proper to treat what you know as a reason is that it’s proper to treat what 
you justifiably believe as a reason and knowledge requires justification.  If we adopt a closure 
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view is not that it’s incoherent.  Problems for this view emerge if we think about its implications 
for Gettier cases.  If knowledge is the norm of belief, subjects are obliged to refrain from believing 
in Gettier cases and so can’t believe with justification in such cases.  The most the subject could 
hope for in such cases is an excuse.  But, this seems highly counterintuitive.  Consider one of your 
run of the mill Gettier cases.  Having just her finished lunch, Plum hands the waitress a ten-dollar 
bill.  She reasonably believes that she’s paid her bill.  She has paid her bill with genuine currency.  
However, unbeknownst to her, she’s dining in the land of fake ten-dollar bills.  She doesn’t know 
she’s handed the waitress a genuine ten dollar bill because there are fake bills in the other diners’ 
pockets that would easily pass for the real thing.  So, she doesn’t know that she’s really paid her 
bill.  Think about her belief that she has paid her bill.  Do we really think, knowing what we know, 
that there is something to be excused here?  Knowing what we know, we wouldn’t say that she 
oughtn’t believe what she does.  There was no breach to excuse, much less justify.  The knowledge 
account says that there are conclusive reasons to refrain believing where there are none.    
 
3.3  A REMAINING OPTION 
 
We might sum up the problems for the knowledge account and evidentialism as follows.  We can 
think of a belief’s justification in terms of our doing all that is demanded by the norms that govern 
belief.  We do all that is demanded if our beliefs conform to the undefeated reasons associated with 
a norm and have taken all due care to see to this.  The problem that the evidentialist faces is that it 
seems that if they take truth to be the norm of belief, they have to insist that the justification of 
belief involves more than just relations between that belief and the evidence.  If, however, they 
insist that a belief’s justification involves just relations between the belief and the evidence, they 
either deny that reasons demand conformity or deny that belief is a state governed by the truth 
norm.  They should say neither of these things.  The knowledge account faces a structurally similar 
problem.  If they take knowledge to be the norm of belief, they have to say that if you fail to know 
for any reason, there’s a conclusive reason to abandon the belief.  To bring that in line with 
intuition, they have to say that reasons demand less than full conformity.  As reasons do demand 
conformity and there’s less to justification than knowledge, knowledge is not the norm of belief. 
 The norms of belief are concerned with more than just relations between beliefs and bodies 
of knowledge or evidence but less than that which turns a belief into knowledge.  So, what is the 
norm of belief?  Perhaps the fundamental norm of belief is the truth norm, the norm that says that 
we oughtn’t believe p unless p is true.  It’s often said that belief aims at the truth, and some have 
suggested that we ought to unpack this metaphor in normative terms.  I’m quite happy to do this.  
True beliefs can do what beliefs are supposed to do.  False beliefs cannot.  What beliefs are 
supposed to do is represent how things are so that we might rely on them for the purpose of 
deliberation.  They’re supposed to give us the reasons from which we can then reason, and if 
reasons are the facts represented by beliefs, false beliefs cannot do what beliefs are supposed to                                                         
principle on which having a justified belief ensures having a reason to believe that which is an 
obvious consequence of what is believed, belief can be justified only if it is true.  Here’s the 
argument.  Assuming our closure principle, if S’s belief that p is justified, S has a reason to believe 
that which is an obvious consequence of p.  That p is true is as obvious a consequence of p as 
anything could be.  Thus, it follows that if S’s belief that p is justified, p is an epistemic reason of 
S’s.  But, p is an epistemic reason of S’s only if p.  (In Littlejohn (Forthcoming), I argue that 
justifying reasons are factive.)  Thus, if S’s belief that p is justified, p is true.    
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because they cannot contribute reasons from which we might deliberate.  Rather, they pass off non-
reasons as if they were reasons.       
Some have argued that you cannot build a theory of justification starting from just the 
assumption that truth is the norm of belief.  That assumption, they say, is far too weak to do the 
work it must.31  If we say that truth is the norm of belief, it seems that any true belief will be 
‘correct’.  But then it seems that any true belief will be justified, and this is clearly false.32  It would 
be clearly false to say that any true belief is justified, but this isn’t what the truth account says.  It’s 
hardly news that there can be undefeated reasons to refrain from Φ-ing even if Φ-ing fulfills some 
goal at which it’s permissible to aim.  If I’m right about what reasons demand, the reason associated 
with the truth norm does demand that you refrain from believing falsehoods.  In the absence of 
overriding reason to believe falsehoods, false beliefs will be unjustifiable.  If I’m right about what 
reasons demand, the reason associated with the truth norm also demands that you refrain from 
believing if your believing indicates a lack of due care for conforming to the truth norm.  That is to 
say, it’s because you oughtn’t believe what’s false that you oughtn’t hold those beliefs only an 
irresponsible or irrational person could hold.  Insofar as this requires having beliefs backed by the 
sort of evidence we’d think of as the sort of evidence a reasonable and responsible person would 
have prior to believing, there’s no reason to think that a belief’s truth suffices for its justification. 
If truth is the norm of belief, we can say that there’s reason to refrain from holding those 
beliefs that fail to faithfully represent how things are and reason to refrain from holding those 
beliefs for which you are properly faulted for holding.  If a belief’s justification can be cashed out in 
terms of a believer doing all that the reasons required, we can say that the justified belief is the 
faultlessly held belief that faithfully represents how things are.  If we think of justified belief as the 
inner analogue of warranted assertion, then perhaps the following gives some motivation for the 
view.  Plum asserts that Green had planned on killing Mustard for years but missed the opportunity 
when Mustard died of natural causes.  If Green never planned any such thing, Green can say 
truthfully that Plum shouldn’t have asserted this.33  If we know that Plum had no evidence to back 
this assertion, this fact alone gives us sufficient warrant to say she oughtn’t have asserted this and 
we can fault her for the assertion.  Is there some third way for Plum’s assertion to be wrongful?  I 
can’t think of one.  Perhaps an assertion is unwarranted if false, unwarranted if unsupported by the 
evidence, and not unwarranted otherwise.  It’s tempting to think that the features in virtue of 
which she oughtn’t have asserted falsely that p are the features in virtue of which she oughtn’t have 
asserted without evidence that p.  So, it’s tempting to think that there’s some single set of 
considerations in light of which something demands that she refrains from asserting the false and                                                         
31 Williamson (2000: 245).  I address his argument in detail in Littlejohn (2010).          
32 Vahid (2006: 305) says that a consequence of Wedgwood’s (2002b) view that a belief is correct 
(in a normative sense) iff the proposition believed is true and this commits him to saying we ought 
to believe all truths. I think this is easily avoided.  Correctness doesn’t entail the non-existence of 
reasons to refrain.  Think about true assertions that express unreasonably held beliefs.  Vahid also 
objects on the grounds that Wedgwood’s view implies that no false beliefs are justified.  In 
Littlejohn (2009b), I explain why an externalist view with this implication is consistent with our 
ordinary intuitions about justification ascription.   
33 Suppose truth is the norm of belief.  If assertion wasn’t subject to the truth norm, it should be 
possible for me to permissibly assert p knowing that you’d accept my say so even if it’s wrong for 
you to accept p.  That seems unacceptable.  It’s odd to think to yourself that it’s not wrong to 
sincerely assert knowing that it would be taken at face value when it’s wrong for others to take the 
assertion at face value and thereby believe it. 
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asserting without evidence.  We have one ground with two conceptually related demands.  
Further, it’s tempting to think of assertion and belief in parallel.  If the norms of belief permit 
belief, they permit asserting that the belief is true.  If the norms don’t permit the belief, the norms 
of assertion won’t then let you assert what you oughtn’t believe.  If there’s nothing more and 
nothing less to warranted assertion than what I’ve suggested, a belief’s justification will not involve 
less than the belief’s faultlessly and faithfully representing how things are.  Maybe there’s not much 
more to it, either.34    
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